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Abstract 
This paper examines the integration of China into the world trading system, focusing on the size and 
nature of the shocks that this implied for the world economy and the reactions to those shocks 
proposed by policy makers and academics. While the WTO has acted as a forum in which many of the 
adjustment pressures created by China’s rapid growth were dealt with fairly constructively, the recent 
shift by the United States and the EU to mega-regional trade deals, notably the Tran-Pacific 
Partnership, and that exclude China, marks a dangerous shift away from engaging the world’s second 
largest economy as an equal in a cooperative fashion. 
Keywords  
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 1 
Introduction* 
This paper examines the integration of China into the world trading system. It discusses the size and 
nature of the shocks that it administered to the world economy and some of the reactions to those 
shocks proposed by policy makers and academics. From its awakening in 1978 China was welcomed 
into the global economy and generated a huge boost in terms of output and incomes – the ‘in and up’ 
part of the title. Recently, however, concerns have been expressed about the Chinese economy 
crashing and imposing a negative shock on world demand, and steps have also been taken to exclude it 
from the major trade initiatives that we have come to term the mega-regionals – the ‘down and out’ 
part. It is too early to know about either of the latter phenomena for certain, but it is useful to consider 
some of the arguments in order that policy towards China does not run into a disastrous blind alley.  
It is a great pleasure to honour Patrick Messerlin in this paper. Patrick has been one of the foremost 
exponents of applied trade policy analysis and advice over several decades with an unfailing focus on 
the key issues of the day. I will argue that integrating China into the global economy in a way that 
benefits nearly all presents perhaps the most important international trade and trade policy issue of our 
present era, and so it is no surprise that it is one which Patrick has addressed himself. Among the 
papers that you will find in his long list of achievements are:  
 Walking with Giants, Project Syndicate, 
 Redesigning the European Union’s trade policy strategy towards China, 
 The Doha Development Agenda: Asian Challenges and Prospects,  
 China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards, and  
 China’s Trade Policy post-WTO Accession. 
This paper argues that the shock that the emergence of China is administering to the world economy is 
larger than any seen previously – and by a large margin. The shock has many manifestations but here, 
in line with Patrick’s great expertise, I focus on its effects on and via the world trading system. The 
paper suggests that, while the huge increase in global production that the success of China brings has 
generated widespread benefits, there will inevitably be some stresses and indeed possibly some losers. 
Some of these stresses are essentially microeconomic – competitive pressure on firms elsewhere in the 
world – while another set arises from the macroeconomic imbalances that China’s rapid growth has 
induced globally. Part of China’s integration into the global economy entailed her joining the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and this has become a forum in which many of the stresses just 
noted have been debated: I note that China has adapted completely to the standard forms of behaviour 
within the WTO despite suffering from a number of asymmetries in her treatment by other members. 
One potential asymmetry that has mercifully been put on the back-burner for now is to bring 
exchange-rates within the purview of the WTO with a view to punishing China’s alleged under-
valuation of its currency. But just as this danger passed another has arisen in the form of the mega-
regional trade deals – notably the Tran-Pacific Partnership – which I argue are designed to exclude 
China.  
Possibly the most important role of economists in policy-making – and one which characterises 
significant parts of Patrick Messerlin’s career – is to discourage policy-makers’ instincts to react 
inappropriately to challenges. The challenges that China have posed within the trading system have 
mostly eventually been dealt with fairly constructively, which is something both Chinese and western 
                                                     
*
 This paper is a substantially revised and extended version of the paper I gave at the conference in honour of Professor 
Patrick Messerlin at Yale Center for the Study of Globalization on 3rd and 4th December 2011 – ‘China and the World 
Trading System: Thrills, Chills - and a few Spills?’. I am grateful to colleagues at the conference for comments. 
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governments can take some pride in. However, I do not include the last mentioned response – the 
mega-regionals – in that set, and this paper ends by sounding a warning.  
1. The macroeconomic shock 
In the three decades following the Communist Revolution in 1947, China displayed a respectable but 
by no means spectacular rate of economic growth. After an initial fall, Maddison (2007, table 2.2b) 
puts the growth in gross domestic product (GDP) at 4.4 percent per annum over the period 1952 to 
1978 and growth in GDP per capita at 2.3 percent; this growth was associated with a strong re-
orientation from agriculture to industry. Over this period, China increased its share of world GDP 
from 4.6 percent to 4.9 percent. Arguably more important from our point of view, however, is that 
over the preceding two hundred years China had played little role in the world economy and that the 
decades of Communism did nothing to redress this. In 1950 China exported goods worth $11.6 per 
capita of population at 1990 prices (compared with (war-torn) Japan’s $42.21) and by 1973 this had 
grown to $13.26 (compared to Japan’s $874.87) – Maddison (2007, table 2.4). So far as international 
economics was concerned, China barely existed.  
In 1978, China took the first tentative steps towards opening up, first internally, with the household 
responsibility system, and then gradually externally. The outlines of the rest of the story are well-
known: China grew phenomenally in terms of GDP, in terms of exports and even, actually, in terms 
imports. Table 1 summarises the situation, starting from 1981 the approximate point at which it had 
discernible effects on the rest of the world.  
Table 1: China’s growth 1981-2014 
1981 2014 growth pa
Population (billions) 0.994 1.364 1.0%
GDP (constant 2005 US$ billions) 228 5,274 10.0%
GDP, PPP (constant 2011 international $ billions) 746 17,202 10.0%
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 750 12,609 8.9%  
Source: World Development Indicators Online, 28
th
 September 2015.  
Note: the PPP data for 1981 have been estimated from data on a 2005 price basis and the conversion factors 
implied between the 2011 and 2005 bases, both collected from WDI Online in June 2011.  
Rows 2 and 3 of the table show China maintaining aggregate growth of 10 percent per annum for over 
three decades, whether in (constant) market prices or international (PPP) prices. Moreover, China 
managed more successfully than other developing countries to control population growth – row 1 – 
with the result that incomes per head increased by 9 percent per annum. In an earlier work – Winters 
and Yusuf (2007) – I showed such strong growth is not wholly unprecedented, for Korea, Taiwan and 
Japan all showed similar trends for at least two decades. But two features are unprecedented, however: 
first, the differential between the super-growers’ growth rates and that of the world economy during 
their growth-phases – see Winters and Yusuf, table 1.2 – and second, the combination of rapid growth 
and huge size. Table 2, which is partly based on a slide from McKinsey, makes the point powerfully. 
While it took Britain, as the only industrial country in the eighteenth century, 155 years to double 
income per head from the boundary of extreme poverty to well into middle-income territory, it took 
the USA and Germany about 60 years in the nineteenth century, Japan 33 years in the early twentieth 
century and China 12 years in the later twentieth century. And while the first four examples covered 
no more than 2.6% of the world’s population at the start of their growth spurts, China’s applied to 
more than 20% of it.  
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Table 2: Chinese Growth in Long-Run Context 
 doubling period Initial population 
 years duration millions % of world 
Britain 1700-1855 155 9 1.4% 
USA 1820-1873 53 10 0.9% 
Germany 1830-1894 64 28 2.4% 
Japan 1906-1939 33 47 2.6% 
China 1983-1995 12 1023 21.8% 
Note: Period for the doubling of GDP pc from $1300 PPP to $2600 Sources: Maddison (2006). World 
population data interpolated from Goldewijk (2005), except for 1983 which comes from World Development 
Indicators online.  
Growth of the magnitude that China has generated affects global equilibria in many areas such as the 
UN Security Council or the International Court of Justice as well as simple economic ones. However, 
so far as other countries are concerned, those pertaining to the world trading system are the most 
immediate, direct and visible and quite possibly the most important. For example, exploding levels of 
international trade were a key contributor to China’s successful growth model, and also to the 
aggregate levels of international trade, growth and prosperity elsewhere. And booming trade has also 
underpinned other aspects of China’s international economic relations which have also proved 
contentious – for example, its aid policies or its massive levels of reserves and consequent role in 
international finance.  
China’s enormous appetite for natural resources, including food and energy, affects prices and 
availability elsewhere and raises incentives for production and investment in these international 
industries, regardless of whether they are used to produce goods for its own consumption or that of 
others. All international trade has distributional effects – which is why it is so contentious – but the 
introduction of a huge supplier at one end (the labour-intensive end) of the spectrum of comparative 
advantage has had profound competitive effects on other labour abundant countries, and these effects 
are gradually starting to spread to other countries as China develops other skills and comparative 
advantages. Moreover, the large production that China has made available has driven down prices for 
consumers, especially the poorer ones who purchase less sophisticated varieties (Broda and Weinstein, 
2009).  
The trade link also has institutional form in the shape of the WTO. While accession to the WTO 
must have boosted China’s growth and integration, it correspondingly means that if anything did go 
wrong, the WTO would be damaged with a consequent loss of the other functions it plays in the world 
economy such as settling disputes, transmitting information and smoothing relations between other 
pairs of countries.  
The changes in China’s international trade are proportionately even larger than those in aggregate 
income contained in table 2. Table 3 shows that the growth of Chinese exports and imports averaged 
16% for over three decades and that of foreign exchange reserves nearly 20%. These reserves 
increased from covering eight months’ imports in 1981, at which point Chinese trade was more or less 
balanced, to nearly two years’ worth in 2014, in which exports exceeded imports by about 20%. 
Moreover, China has shifted from being a net exporter of industrial raw materials to being a massive 
net importer.  
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Table 3: China’s Changing International Trade 
1981 2014 growth pa
Exports $ billions 14.6 2,343 16.6%
Imports $ billions 14.6 1,960 16.0%
Fuels and ores as percentage of:
Imports 6.0 * 28.7
Exports 25.2 * 2.8
Reserves $ billions 10.1 3,900 19.8%
      as % of imports 69% 199%  
Source: World Development Indicators Online, 28
th
 September 2015. * refers to 1984, not 1981 
2. The microeconomic shock for manufacturers 
Given the size of the macroeconomic turnaround just outlined, it is not surprising that some sectors 
faced significant pressure and adjustment as a result of the emergence of China as a major 
manufacturer. I consider this pressure from three separate perspectives. First, Wood and Mayer (2009) 
consider the effect of China’s arrival on global factor endowments and on the resulting changes in 
other countries’ comparative advantage. While the emergence of China obviously contributed some 
land, capital and skilled labour to the world’s endowments of factors of production, its principal and 
disproportionately large contribution was in unskilled labour. Wood and Mayer estimate that it raised 
the global ratio of labour with basic education to all labour by 7 to 9 percent and reduced the ratio of 
(land + natural resources) to all labour by 10 to 17 percent
1. The authors say ‘Neither of these impacts 
is vast, but nor is either trivial’; I doubt if any such shock had been experienced over a period as short 
as two decades.  
The consequence of these changes in the global aggregates was that many countries that had 
previously been able to trade as unskilled labour abundant countries now found themselves outside 
that class and having to behave rather as abundant in (middle-level) skills or in natural resources. The 
resulting adjustments, compressed into so short a period, were potentially quite dramatic. Applying a 
Heckscher-Ohlin model of world trade in which capital flows freely and hence may be ignored, Wood 
and Mayer calculate that these changes in endowments meant that on average other countries reduced 
the ratio of labour-intensive manufactures to primary production by 7 to 10 percent for output and 10 
to 15 percent for exports. In East Asia, which had long appeared to be the most labour abundant 
region, these developments caused significant de-industrialisation. Elsewhere, Wood and Mayer argue, 
they were quantitatively less significant, although, as discussed below, they did still have an effect.  
The second and third exercises to identify competitive pressure concern competition between 
Mexican and Chinese producers, most of which, I would argue, takes place in the US market. As a 
middle income producer of relatively labour-intensive manufactures Mexico might be thought to be 
particularly vulnerable to competition from China, especially given that within the North American 
preferential trade bloc NAFTA, Mexico has a specific comparative advantage in such sectors. 
Moreover the focus on third country markets as the locus of competition provides an important policy 
perspective, for even if Mexico chose to protect its own market from Chinese competition, it cannot 
unilaterally do so in the third markets in which the two suppliers meet.  
                                                     
1 
The differences reflect different ways of aggregating across countries. The smaller estimates weight countries’ 
endowments together by their shares of world trade, the larger ones by shares of world labour force.  
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In the second exercise, reported fully in Iacovone, Rauch and Winters (2013), we look at the effect 
of Chinese competition on the survival chances and sales of Mexican firms both at home and in the 
USA. The sample comprises plant-level data for nearly all Mexican manufacturers (data on some 
small firms are missing) over the period 1994-2004. Over six thousand plants are covered and nearly 
three thousand individual products. As well as considering competition in a third market, the other 
innovation of this work is to allow the effects of competition to vary over firms – in most cases with 
plant-size – and products – with the importance of a product in its plant’s total output.  
The results are consistent and stark. While competition from China (measured as China’s share of 
Mexican or US imports of the product concerned) seems to hit smaller plants and minor products quite 
hard, it has relatively little impact on plants’ main products or on the largest of plants. In line with 
other literature on firms, one can take size as a good proxy for productivity, so the conclusion is that 
competition tends to drive weaker plants and products either out of business or to contract while 
leaving stronger ones either unaffected or even able to expand.  
Figure 1: The effect of Chinese competition on product sales and exit 
 
Figure 1 summarises Iacovone, Rauch and Winters’ (2013) results for products. Similar patterns are 
uncovered at the level of the plant. The horizontal axis reports product size (position in the ranking of 
plants – centiles) and the vertical axis the marginal effect of an increase in Chinese competition on 
plant sales in Mexico (domestic) and the USA (exports) in the left-hand block and the marginal effect 
on the probability of the products being withdrawn from sale completely (exit) in the right-hand block. 
For small products (where, say, they account for 10 percent of a plant’s total sales) the effect on sales 
is strongly negative – a 1percent increase in competition leading to a 0.4% decline in Mexican sales, 
whereas for products at the 90
th
 centile, the effect on sales is positive - approximately 0.1% for export 
sales and approximately 0.3% for domestic sales. The broken lines are 95% confidence intervals and 
so one can see that the latter effect is significantly positive. Turning to exit on the right, the story is the 
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same. For small products (10
th
 centile) the effect of a 1 percent increase in Chinese competition is to 
increase the probability of exit from the export market by about 0.1 percent and from the home market 
by about 0.5 percent. For large plants competition reduces the probability of exit – i.e. is associated 
with an increase in the chances of survival. We cannot identify the precise mechanism at work here, 
but it may well be that as Chinese competition eliminates weaker firms, sector-specific factors of 
production are released for stronger firms to take on.
2
  
The stress is plain here. While Chinese competition may be quite a constructive force for the long-
run growth of productivity and incomes – it helps to eliminate the weak and boost the strong – it is a 
political nightmare in distributional terms in most countries and is likely to raise serious calls for the 
management or even curtailment of trade. Giving in to this will mean benefits foregone in both China 
and its trading partners.  
The final evidence of competitive pressure shows how Chinese competition constrains the export 
prices of Mexican producers in the US market. Pang and Winters (2012) use data at the 6-digit level of 
the Harmonised System classification between 1992 and 2008 to show that on average changes in 
Chinese prices on the US market induce changes in Mexican prices in the same direction and of a little 
under half the size.
3
 Chinese pricing has been very competitive over this period driven by China’s 
strongly increasing productivity: for example, Hsieh and Ossa (2011) suggest that productivity growth 
in Chinese manufacturing sectors ranged from 7.4 percent to 24.3 percent and averaged 13.8 percent 
over 1995-2007. Thus while Chinese producers have been able keep prices down because their costs 
are falling, Mexican producers have felt obliged to follow suit partially, but with weaker productivity 
growth, have seen their margins squeezed. These results are consistent with the previous ones of exit 
and declining sales, but may also be partly additional to them. Iacovone, Rauch and Winters did not 
have data on margins and so it is perfectly possible that even though Mexican firms stayed in business, 
they did so with weaker margins and hence lower value added.  
These last results also cast light on a further cause of concern that has been expressed about China 
–‘exporting deflation’. Much of this argument is of a macro nature, which I will deal with later, but if 
it is to be taken literally as placing downward pressure on prices, the mechanism must be as I have 
described here. A number of scholars have tried to identify the effect of Chinese growth on aggregate 
prices by relating prices in the USA or other developed countries to the quantity of Chinese exports 
e.g. Kamin, Marazzi and Schindler (2006). Such attempts have largely failed and led to the conclusion 
that China is not exporting deflation – e.g. Broda and Weinstein (2010). Part of the problem is that 
despite China’s large size and openness, goods from China still only account for around three percent 
of US expenditure, and hence can have only a tiny direct influence on US aggregate price indices. If 
China is to have a discernible effect on such indices, it has to be by influencing the prices at which 
other producers sell, and this is the issue that Pang and Winters tackle directly.  
These results do indeed suggest that China contributed to the ‘Great Moderation’ whereby western 
economies seemed more or less to have abolished inflation, despite operating at high levels of capacity 
utilisation and stoking up a huge credit boom. They are also, however, eminently reversible, and 
although current pre-occupations with China are more to do with China exporting deflation via 
declining demand and output – see below - when these cyclical phenomena have worked themselves 
out I would expect China to exercise very much less downward pressure on western prices.  
                                                     
2 
In additional tests we show that skill-intensive firms fare better than less skill-intensive ones and that larger firms and 
products appear to be better placed to take advantage of the improved and cheaper flow of intermediate inputs that 
Chinese expansion entails.  
3 
The model is based loosely on a Bertrand model of duopolistic interaction with differentiated products, whereby 
producers compete via prices, as used, for example, in Chang and Winters (2002).  
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3. China and the WTO 
The World Trade Organisation has rightly sought to become truly global in terms of membership and 
welcoming China in late 2001 was perhaps the biggest and most natural recent step towards that goal. 
China’s accession has been analysed extensively – including by Patrick Messerlin himself – and I shall 
consider only a couple of issues concerning, respectively, China’s integration as an active, but 
possibly not yet equal, member of the WTO and China’s role in the ongoing Doha Round.  
There was some interest – and concern in some quarters – as to how China would settle into the 
WTO institutionally. China has not had a great enthusiasm for joining organisations in which it played 
no formative role and the question arose of whether China would behave as ‘regular club member’, be 
disruptive or just maintain aloof. After fourteen years we can say with confidence that China has 
become a ‘regular guy’ pursuing, like other members, what it perceives as its own interests within the 
context of existing WTO rules and practices. Of course, this has been uncomfortable for others at 
times and some issues have proved more important to China than to other members, but there is no 
hint of fundamental differences in approach.  
China has played a pretty active role in the achievement of transparency within the WTO. As 
Collins-Williams and Wolfe (2010) have observed, over the period to 2006-8, China made over 500 
notifications on product standards to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), was 
active in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Committee and even participated in the 
Agriculture Committee. China has also been heavily involved in the WTO’s dispute settlement 
procedures. It has more often been respondent than plaintiff but the surprising figure is the frequency 
with which it has taken third-party status – observing and making minor contributions to cases 
primarily involving other members. Most commentators see this last phenomenon as a conscious 
learning strategy by which China sought to develop the skills and experience necessary to handle its 
own cases successfully. Hsieh (2010) makes a strong case that China’s lack of legal capacity has been 
a major constraint on its ability to pursue WTO disputes independently and may have led it to fare less 
well in the cases it has been involved in. As with so many issues that it identifies, China has set about 
redressing the lack of skills vigorously. WTO Centres were set up in several universities and Chinese 
scholars are increasingly active in academic and policy debate around trade policy and the trading 
system. Patrick Messerlin has greatly aided this learning process himself, by fostering links and fora in 
which Chinese and other commentators can meet.  
Kennedy (2012) offers a detailed account of China’s engagement in WTO disputes. He concludes 
that China has been playing the role of a “system-maintainer” by conforming to the practices of WTO 
dispute settlement, even as those practices develop. China has mainly used the system to challenge the 
differentiated treatment of its exports meted out by its two largest trading partners, the USA and the 
EU, at least some of which stems from what the Chinese consider to be an asymmetric and unfair 
Protocol of Accession. Kennedy argues that the cases that China has initiated arise largely in 
retaliation to occasions in which it felt that a particular partner was initiating ‘too many’ cases against 
China; that they were, perhaps, ‘warning shots’ about the problems that an uncooperative China could 
cause. Such retaliation is by no means unique to China. Moreover, China has never initiated a case 
against a developing country, even those that have participated in cases against China. Hence, overall, 
fears that China would disrupt the WTO’s enforcement function have not materialised.  
Two specific asymmetries have irked the Chinese: non-market treatment and export restraints. On 
the former, the EU and the US continue to deny China market economy status in anti-dumping cases, 
with the result that they both find it easy to hit her with heavier anti-dumping duties than apply to 
other countries. China sees this as unfair and offensive – and I sympathise. In principle, non-market 
treatment should cease in 2016 according to the Protocol of Accession, although there is talk that the 
USA and the EU may find a way to perpetuate it, and, in truth, if the proponents of non-market 
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treatment lose this tool, they will probably find another – e.g. the double jeopardy of simultaneous 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy action – see Gatta and Vermulst (2012). Hence in many ways the issue 
is more symbolic than substantive, so given that only a fraction of trade is subject to anti-dumping 
action, it seems to me that in the grand scheme of integrating into the world economy, China has much 
more important issues to deal with.  
The second asymmetry that has caused angst is that China is more constrained from imposing 
export restrictions than are other WTO members. Within the mercantilist mind set which conditions 
the structure and practice of the WTO, consciously restraining exports is almost inconceivable, and 
faces very few constraints in the WTO agreements: quantitative export restrictions are generally 
discouraged but export taxes remain entirely unconstrained for all but a few recently acceded 
countries. China is among these, having been required to commit to using export taxes on no products 
other than eighty-four products that were listed in its Protocol of Accession.  
Every past GATT/WTO dispute concerning export restrictions has revolved around the accusation 
that a member has been reducing the price of an input to downstream producers and so enhancing their 
competitiveness unfairly (a mercantilist argument). And, at least in some cases, there has been a sub-
theme that the policy involved has increased prices abroad. China has now been involved in two such 
cases – a dispute brought in 2009 over export taxes and quantitative restrictions on exports of bauxite, 
coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, phosphate (yellow phosphorus), silicon (metal and carbide), 
and zinc, and one brought in 2012 on exports of so-called rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum. Both 
have been concluded with rulings that reject just about every argument put forth by the Chinese, and in 
particular rejecting claims that the export restrictions were necessary in order to prevent environmental 
damage and to conserve resources, both of which are recognised under GATT Article XX (paragraphs 
(b) and (g) respectively) as reasons to exempt countries from the ban on quantitative restrictions on 
exports. The problem for the Chinese in both cases was that domestic use of the minerals in question 
was increasing and/or domestic prices were lower at the same time as exports were being curtailed, 
although, in the rare earths case, these conditions largely disappeared soon after the case commenced.
4
  
Chinese irritation was redoubled in the rare earths case by a slightly complex legal argument. The 
dispute panel and the Appellate Body of the WTO held that even if export restrictions were necessary 
to conserve rare earth resources, the Chinese did not have access to Article XX of the GATT, the 
General Exceptions clause, which recognises this as a potentially legitimate reason to control exports. 
This is because the article in the Protocol of Accession that deals with export restraints did not 
explicitly specify that it was subject to Article XX of the GATT. Thus although the Protocol of 
Accession and the rest of the WTO treaty are to be read as a whole in defining China’s rights and 
obligations, it was successfully argued that this did not amount to permitting later documents (the 
Protocol) to appeal to earlier ones (the General Exceptions Article) except where this had been 
explicitly negotiated. Since access to Article XX had been negotiated in some cases but not for export 
restraints, the Appellate Body interpreted its absence in the latter as conscious and binding. There is no 
evidence that the members of WTO would have resisted such a direct appeal to Article XX, and so it 
seems to me that this is a case where the Chinese might ask the lawyers handling their accession 
process whether they had let their clients down! 
Having said that, however, I am comfortable with the outcome from a systemic perspective. The 
use of export restrictions to keep domestic prices for consumers down became quite widespread during 
the food price hike of 2005-08, but, as is well understood, such behaviour typically increases prices for 
everyone else. Sharma (2011) states that 31 out of 105 countries covered in an FAO survey imposed 
food export restrictions between 2007 and 2010, and Anderson and Martin (2011) estimate that 45 
percent of the increase in world rice prices, and 30 percent of the increase in world wheat prices, over 
                                                     
4
 Karapinar (2011) offers a good discussion of the raw materials case. Bond and Trachtman (2016) cover the rare earths 
one. In the interests of transparency I note that I advised the European Commission in the latter case. 
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2006-08 were due to ‘insulating behaviour’, which included export restrictions and the relaxation of 
import restrictions. The immediate distributional effects of these restrictions are clear enough, but 
more worrying for the long term is what such behaviour does to the case for relying on international 
markets for critical products. Like Patrick Messerlin, I have spent a large part of my career trying to 
persuade governments that food security is not the same as self-sufficiency, and I still believe it. 
However, if the cost of adjustment to shocks is to be borne solely by food importers rather than 
importers and exporters together, the price volatility which importers face will be great, and many 
governments will be tempted to forego the benefits of the international division of labour in order to 
avoid accusations that they are putting their citizens at risk of food shortages. That is, by refusing to 
sell, exporters are in danger of destroying their markets in the long run, to the cost of both exporters 
and importers. 
Thus, in both food and materials, export restrictions are a particular challenge to the world trading 
system because for most members there are no restraints on export taxes provided that they are not so 
high as to constitute export bans. And even then restraints on quantitative restrictions recognise 
environmental exceptions, which might weaken them. Export restraints are just as disruptive to 
international trade as are import restraints, and so I would make a high priority of negotiating an 
agreement that disciplined their use. Maybe, as a country that has already largely submitted to such 
disciplines, China might lead such a negotiation. 
A second alleged challenge to Chinese integration into the WTO is the Doha Round, which some, 
particularly in the USA, hold to be stalled because China is offering too little. That China should offer 
a good deal of liberalisation is accepted by everyone, including the Chinese, but here I think other 
countries are making a mountain out of a molehill. China’s accession process was long-lived and 
entailed a huge amount of reform and liberalisation. The Doha Round was initiated as the accession 
process drew to a close, and was billed both to last only three or four years and to be substantially 
about continuing the business of the Uruguay Round. In 2001, when it started, no-one expected China 
to play an active role at all. Now fourteen years on, the Doha Round is still underway and China has 
more than trebled the size of its economy. Clearly China might now be expected to contribute 
something – and indeed China has agreed to do so – but the demands made of China for deep cuts in 
tariffs on manufactured products from the levels agreed at accession seem quite unreasonable to me. 
For sure, China cannot stand aside from the general liberalisation that a successful conclusion to the 
Doha Round would entail, but to blame China for the effective demise of the round by not coming up 
with more, seems to me a travesty. Having said that, however, I do believe that China needs to come 
back to the WTO with more liberalisation – see Section 5 below – but not in the context of the Doha 
Round.  
4. Global Imbalances and Chinese Growth 
The biggest ‘crime against the world trading system’ of which China has been accused is its huge 
current account surpluses over 2005-11 and the massive stock of international reserves that they gave 
rise to, and which still largely persists. The corresponding deficits elsewhere were held to drain 
demand out of partner countries (exporting deflation from a different perspective) and the imbalances 
are frequently named as a major cause of the financial crisis of 2007 onwards. There a little truth in 
both statements, but it is important to keep them in perspective. Moreover, seven years on from the 
crisis, after the Chinese surplus has substantially eroded, we can start to observe a certain (misplaced) 
nostalgia for the ‘old’ way of running the world economy.  
Macro-economically the imbalances reflected, but also permitted, the boom over 2002-2007, with 
the surplus countries able to increase their output and employment strongly and the deficit countries to 
maintain high levels of consumption and demand. Of course, we can now see that such growth was 
unsustainable and that adjustment had to occur, but absent the financial crisis (which was not caused 
by the Chinese, even if it was facilitated by them), it is not clear that over-heating per se created 
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particular large problems. In the event, however, massive adjustment has been required of the world 
economy; both private and government sectors have retrenched to try to restore their balance sheets, 
hence cutting demand on a very broad front, and the financial sector nearly collapsed and has 
subsequently cut back lending viciously, further curtailing demand. The Chinese government played a 
very constructive role in addressing the immediate crisis, by supporting Chinese and world demand 
through a huge investment boom funded by extensive borrowing. This helped to support aggregate 
demand and also substantially reduced the Chinese trade imbalance. As discussed below, in the longer 
run, however, this response arguably stored up problems for later.  
China did not cause the financial crisis, which rather arose from the combination of light regulation 
and macro-economic stress in the new millennium. Rajan (2009) argues that partly because 
competitive pressures from China and other low-cost producers constrained real wages among less 
skilled workers, American policy-makers looked to private credit markets to boost their spending 
power; this, in turn, caused the real estate boom and the stock of toxic mortgages that so burdened the 
financial system and private portfolios. On the supply side of the credit market, the low returns 
associated with the loose monetary policy behind this distributional policy and the ‘great moderation’, 
led banks to incur far too many risks in the search for profits. One should not blame any of this on 
China, but it is the case that the high level of Chinese reserves and the absence of local instruments 
with which to absorb high savings in China granted these mistakes huge space in which to work their 
mischief. The fact that China deposited its surplus dollars in New York kept the merry-go-round 
running far longer than it would have done in other circumstances.  
An important question is what lay behind the surpluses? Macroeconomics is basically the process 
of unpicking the relationships between many endogenous variables. While clearly booming exports 
and stagnating imports were the proximate causes of the Chinese current account surplus, they were 
not the underlying causes. Export growth accelerated from about 2001 partly as China’s accession to 
the WTO drew in FDI from Japan, Taiwan and Korea. There was also a significant fall in import 
growth after 2004 mainly as net import of heavy industrial products fell. This partly reflected a build-
up of the stock of equipment over the preceding few years, but also the shift in Chinese capabilities so 
that domestic supplies increased strongly. These changes are partly exogenous and partly symptoms of 
more fundamental forces.  
One causal candidate for the surplus is China’s exchange rate policy, which since around 2004 has 
been associated with moderate undervaluation. Identifying over- or under-valuation is not straight-
forward and while some undervaluation of the Renminbi is clear, claims of major undervaluation seem 
misplaced. For example, between 2005 and 2010 unit labour costs in China increased by about one-
third and the nominal effective exchange rate appreciated by 14%, and between 2010 and 2013 the 
figures were over half and 11% respectively.
5
 That China chose to keep its real exchange rate 
relatively low stems from three strong policy imperatives. The first was to sustain employment growth 
in its export industries with the twin related objectives of maintaining its high rate of export-led 
growth and of preserving ‘Social Harmony’. Chinese policy makers were conscious of a trade-off 
between political reforms and economic returns, which can be crudely characterised as that for as long 
as employment and real wages keep growing fast the population will tolerate the constraints on 
political freedoms and not seek to disturb the Communist Party’s hold on power. Many commentators 
spoke of a 7 percent per annum threshold below which social unrest will occur, but I am aware of no 
analysis that supports this threshold formally. Policy-makers undoubtedly recognised that a slow-down 
in growth was inevitable at some stage but found it much more comfortable to postpone the difficult 
adjustment a bit longer.  
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Unit labour costs from US Department of Commerce (http://acetool.commerce.gov/labor-costs#fn4) and exchange rate 
data from IMF eLibrary.  
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The second imperative was to self-insure against a repeat of the 1997-8 crisis in which many Asian 
countries felt abused by the international system and specifically by the International Monetary Fund 
in return for emergency borrowing. Quite consciously and at times explicitly they said never again 
would they risk falling under the influence of the ‘Washington consensus’. The result was a massive 
accumulation of reserves throughout most of Asia and I believe that China was part of that movement 
based on its observation of its neighbours rather than its own direct experience. In both of these 
objectives, past exchange rate policy had been extraordinarily successful and we should appreciate the 
difficulties that policy-makers face in shifting to a different strategy at the behest of other countries.  
The third imperative was that a large and rapid exchange rate appreciation would have created 
large paper loses in Renminbi for the holders of dollar assets. To the extent that these were the 
commercial banks there could easily be a messy banking crisis, for received wisdom is that the banks 
are already burdened by very high levels of non-performing loans. While the Chinese government has 
the resources to support and re-capitalise the banks if necessary, it is very nervous about processes 
which it cannot fully control and dislikes acting under duress. Of course, the nearly US$4 trillion of 
reserves now held by the Bank of China will also show large paper losses as appreciation occurs, but 
these are easier to gloss over than those in the commercial sector.
6
  
The true cause of China’s large current account surplus was macro-economic imbalance – high net 
savings by the household, corporate and government sectors. Chinese households have high savings 
relative to those in many developing countries, but, at about 20% of GDP, not unprecedentedly so.
7
 
Moreover, given the very rapid rate at which China’s population is aging, the one child policy and the 
relative lack of government-provided services and pensions, high savings seem rational and likely to 
persist. Much more unusual are enterprise savings which accounted for about 20% of GDP in the mid-
2000s. Lane and Schmukler (2007) argue that these reflect the low (zero) dividends paid by private 
(state) firms coupled with policies that boost enterprise profits strongly – subsidies to inputs such as 
land and borrowing and low wages supported by rural-urban migration. Until these distortions are 
addressed and ways found to switch corporate profits into consumption (possibly via the government 
account with taxes and social expenditure), the imbalances will not be permanently cured.  
As noted above, China leaned into the wind as world demand collapsed in 2008-9 by stimulating 
official borrowing and investment and was praised for doing so. However, as was argued at the time 
and has subsequently proved correct, the investment exacerbated Chinese excess capacity in 
manufacturing and significantly increased the stock of bad debt. Hence this policy made the inevitable 
cyclical downturn as these positions were unwound deeper and longer and made the climb towards a 
long-run sustainable growth path even steeper. As was already clear in 2007, this path requires the 
Chinese economy to switch from investment and exports as drivers to domestic consumption and 
innovation. The combination of a steep cyclical retrenchment with a dramatic change in growth 
strategy and the inevitable slowing as the economy gets closer to the technological frontier and the 
population ages poses a significant policy challenge for the Chinese government. Growth has started 
to fall from around 10% p.a. in 2010-11 to around 7% in 2013-14 and possibly lower in 2015 and at 
least some commentators now fear not a Chinese boom but a Chinese bust which will suck demand 
out of the world economy, especially that for commodities.  
It is impossible to be sure, for we have never seen a combination of forces such as we now face, but 
I suspect that China will weather the storm. Growth will certainly be lower in future, but over the next 
few years, I would expect it still to be quite buoyant – e.g. 5% or 6% p.a. – so that China will continue 
to converge on the west and will also provide a significant impetus to world demand. This view is 
based on the confidence that I have in Chinese policy-making: it is always possible to imagine better, 
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The losses are just as real, however, and as Larry Summers has observed, China is very far from maximising its economic 
returns by building up such reserves of inevitably depreciating assets.  
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See Vincelette et al (2010) figure 2 for the data. 
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but when one considers the quality of the Chinese transformation over the last few decades, it is hard 
not to believe that Chinese policy-makers understand their position fairly well.  
5. Excluding China? 
China’s formidable growth has provided a series of challenges for the current high-income countries 
and the international institutions that they tend to dominate. These range from the serious competitive 
threat that China has posed to western industry (and hence, perhaps, incomes) through the challenge to 
the western liberal economic model to the strategic challenge as China starts to seek influence in its 
region and in the world commensurate with its economic power. Thus the western attitude to China 
has evolved from welcoming in the 1980s to a much more defensive posture in the 2010s, which has 
sought, inter alia, to curb China’s ability to capture markets. In this section, I consider two examples 
of such exclusionary behaviour, one fortunately rendered moot by circumstances but the other 
immediate and real. This is the ‘out’ in my title. 
The first goes back to global imbalances. Some commentators – e.g. Rodrik (2010) – appealed to 
something like figure 2 to argue that trade and trade policy lay behind China’s massive current account 
surplus:
8
 crudely the argument was that because the surplus boomed as a percentage of GDP shortly 
after China’s accession to the WTO, the latter must be responsible for it. I deal with this at some 
length for two reasons: first Patrick Messerlin and I have both argued over the years that the 
interventionist conclusions derived from this view were wrong; second, the problem has now largely 
dissipated on its own, which suggests that the rush to change institutions to solve it was as unnecessary 
as it was dangerous to the world trading system.  
Figure 2: China’s Trade Balance and Current Account (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators Online, 28
th
 September 2015. 
Note: Trade Balance is the difference between exports of goods and services and imports of goods and services, 
both as a percentage of GDP; WDI Online no longer reports the Chinese current account on a BoP basis before 
2005. 
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Figure 2 reports the trade balance over a long period but the current account only since 2005, because these are the only 
data now in WDI Online. In the earlier version of this paper I used current account data over the period 1980-2011 and 
they told exactly the same story.  
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Rodrik’s argument starts with the assertion that economic growth (and certainly China’s growth 
strategy) requires a rapidly growing tradable manufactures sector, because this is typically where the 
highest productivity activities are found. An intense focus on this sector does not occur with market 
forces alone because of a variety of market failures – poor property rights protection, unrequited 
spillovers between firms, coordination failures, etc. which impinge disproportionately on this sector. 
Hence activist polices are required and have, says Rodrik, been used in virtually every case of 
successful growth. Countries have variously used polices like directed credit, production subsidies, 
export subsidies and protection to achieve tradables growth. Exchange rate undervaluation can also be 
used, and is historically associated with rapid growth, and its use as a growth policy is attractive 
because it does not require sector-specific interventions which are both difficult to design and liable to 
capture.
9
  
One of Rodrik’s innovations is to stress that growth is related to the production of rather than to 
exports of tradables. This means that if a country can simultaneously increase the demand for tradables 
along with their supply, it can grow rapidly without a large trade surplus. Subsidies, possibly bolstered 
by protection to prevent demand seeping abroad, are the obvious route to do this, and this is the way in 
which industrial policy works. Rodrik argues that optimal intervention would see all countries using 
subsidies to cure their local market failures and that in this case the spillovers between countries would 
become irrelevant because each country would be at its optimum. According to Rodrik, the problem 
until 2011 was that WTO membership prevented China (and other countries) from using subsidies, so 
that the government had to turn to exchange rate undervaluation as a second-best tool to boost 
tradables. But undervaluation must inevitably lead to surpluses, he argues, and that is why the WTO is 
responsible for the global imbalances. The ‘obvious’ solution to this, which is explicit in Rodrik 
(2011), is to restore the legitimacy of trade/industrial policy, specifically subsidies, and to manage 
exchange rates multilaterally.  
Rodrik’s writing is seductive, but his analysis is wrong in several respects. First, there are many 
ways to boost tradables output that are WTO-consistent – for example, improving logistics, labour 
training and education and consumption subsidies. They are arguably less immediate and direct than 
straight production subsidies but they are not ineffective. Second, subsidies/protection are just as 
dangerous to the world economy as are trade surpluses. Consider, for example, the intense reactions of 
partners’ industries to subsidies elsewhere which can easily set off subsidy wars of the sort that we 
saw in the 1930s (which also saw competitive devaluations as well, by the way). The idea that the 
optimal intervention offers a stable solution to the global policy game is a chimera – almost certainly 
this situation is characterised by a prisoners’ dilemma in which country A wants to subsidise and to 
prevent country B from doing so. There is no guarantee that a subsidy-permissive regime would not 
degenerate into a subsidy free for all with massive intervention.  
Third, it is also hard to manage exchange rates. The global community has many times called for 
exchange rates to be managed by the IMF and has always failed; efforts through other groups such as 
the Group of 7 have only rarely succeeded. The USA has no intention of surrendering its exchange 
rate sovereignty to the IMF or an equivalent body and so no WTO-like enforcement mechanism for 
exchange rates is imminent. There is just no evidence that countries that compete in subsidy space as 
Rodrik would allow would willingly surrender their policy space in exchange rates. I am not arguing 
that some coordination over exchange rates is not desirable, but that it is foolish to believe that it will 
be at all reliable.  
If Rodrik’s idea to ditch the subsidies disciplines of the WTO and replace them with an exchange 
rate code seems dangerous, the pressure from some commentators to take exchange rates into the 
WTO, and hence to make them subject to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, seems equally so. 
                                                     
9 
Undervaluation’s disadvantage of taxing the consumption of tradables appears to count for rather little with governments 
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(Mattoo and Subramanian, 2009, make the case and it has been taken up by several US Congressmen 
and European politicians). The complexity of measuring undervaluation is great and so the whole 
basis of a dispute will be contentious, and still more so will be the identification of the government 
manipulation that is alleged to cause it. Mattoo and Subramanian say these calculations should be done 
by the IMF and that their doing it on behalf of the WTO will somehow make it politically less 
contentious than the WTO’s doing it on its own behalf, but I do not see why. Part of the way in which 
WTO’s codification of trade interventions is effective is because it replaces political pressures with 
technical definitions with a very narrow focus. The process is not perfect, but it tends to draw the 
political poison. There seems little chance that with something as complicated as macro-economic 
outcomes and management, the same trick will work – see, for example Staiger and Sykes (2010) on 
the difficulties of even defining exchange rate undervaluation in WTO terms.  
It is difficult to see how trade sanctions will address exchange rate frictions effectively: trade 
sanctions will not cure macro-economic distortions, at least not without massive cost. Moreover, 
because they would be aimed against the whole tradables sector, they would largely lack the ability 
that ‘regular’ sanctions have to switch the cost of one tradable sector’s protection to another exporting 
one. But that is not the big worry. The latter is that trying to use sanctions in this way will inflict major 
damage on the WTO as an institution, and that by giving it an impossible brief we will destroy the 
value that we currently reap form the WTO and take for granted. The WTO has neither the structure 
(all decision-taking is in Committees of members, none is by the Secretariat which might be better 
able to maintain a technical view), nor the institutional robustness to be able survive the sort of 
contentious and high-stakes decisions that dispute panels and the Appellate Body would have to take 
in exchange rate cases. Having failed in such cases, the magic that currently leads to high degrees of 
compliance with WTO decisions would be destroyed and we would be left with little leverage against 
‘regular’ violations. And once this happened the chances of other cooperation – e.g. that in 
Committees on other business – would also disappear. In other words, I fear that hanging the exchange 
rate mill-stone round the WTO’s neck would bring it down.  
The second example of ‘out’ is the so-called mega-regional trade deals – particularly the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) but also the Trade-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
10
 The 
former is a trade agreement recently concluded, but not yet ratified or implemented, between twelve 
Pacific countries – Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the USA, and Vietnam. They have a combined GDP of $27.8 trillion, (37 
per cent of the global total), total trade of $11.6 trillion (26%) and have a combined population of 
about 802 million (11%).
11
 There are several possible motives for the USA proposing the enlargement 
of the pre-existing Pacific-4 Agreement into the TPP in 2008. For example, it may have been an 
attempt to revive the flagging Doha Round in the WTO; or an attempt to re-interest US business in 
international trade policy, which was necessary because it had expressed next to no interest in the 
Doha Round; and to some, it was a way for President Bush to embarrass the Democratic Party because 
they would have to choose between a pro-business position (supporting TPP) or a pro-labour one 
(opposing it). Virtually all Americans agreed, however, that it was a chance to bind a significant 
number of partners in to the American conception of economic policy and many believed that in doing 
so they would counter China’s growing influence on East Asian countries.  
The details of the TPP were secret throughout its negotiation and are still secret even now after its 
conclusion. However, leaks and past form give us a reasonable idea of what it entails. Petri, Plummer 
and Zhai (2011) show how the trade agreements signed by the USA are deeper than the more 
traditional shallow agreements already signed by various Asian countries. For example, modelled in 
the US image, the American agreements provide for stronger liberalisation of agriculture, government 
procurement and e-commerce, significant labour clauses, significant restraints on state-owned 
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More detail of the arguments in the rest of this section are to be found in Winters (2015). 
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All statistics come from WDI online (accessed 11th September 2015) and refer to 2013 
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enterprises and much stronger intellectual property protections.
12
 Progress in these dimensions is 
necessary if the TPP is to offer significant economic benefits because much of the trade it will cover is 
already subject to tariff and often other preferences (e.g. via US agreements with Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru and Singapore, ASEAN, P-4).  
The TPP is ostensibly open to any Pacific country that wishes to join it; initially this was also true 
of the negotiations, but in 2013 the members declared that potential members would have to wait until 
the agreement was signed before starting to negotiate. So why does it exclude China? The clauses on 
intellectual property rights, procurement, agriculture and state-owned enterprises, and possibly others 
as well, would involve China in huge reforms that would clearly stretch its political consensus 
severely, possibly to breaking point. Moreover, whereas it seems inevitable that the TPP will allow 
Vietnam long adjustment periods and a degree of latitude in enforcement, any realistic reading of 
Sino-US relations demonstrates that China would receive no such concessions. Thus while the TPP 
was open in principle, it was effectively closed to China.  
Most of what the US model entails is actually sound policy and many TPP countries will benefit 
considerably by adopting it. Nonetheless even where the reforms are desirable, several TPP members 
will probably have to approach the US norms faster than desirable, and possibly faster than they can 
effectively administer. But there are also areas in which the TPP is not in the interests of most non-US 
members – for example, the vigorous intellectual property protections, Investor-State Dispute 
Arbitration and the labour clauses. They accept these, however, because the TPP is a single package 
and it grants them strongly preferred status in US trade policy.  
Once the members of TPP have accepted these norms, they will naturally press, along with the 
USA, for other countries to adopt them. Thus there will be a coalition accounting for nearly 40% of 
world GDP proposing a particular set of rules within the world trading system and it will become very 
hard for other countries to sign agreements with the members that do not go so far. Thus the TPP is 
essentially an attempt to define trading standards not merely for its members but for the world. I 
argued this in Winters (2014), but now it is official: in his weekly radio address as the TPP was 
agreed, President Obama said "without this agreement, competitors that don't share our values, like 
China, will write the rules of the global economy" (http://news.yahoo.com/obama-jabs-china-
defends-tpp-trade-deal-131620791.html). If China, India or Brazil felt that these disciplines were 
too arduous or just did not fit their needs, the world trading system would be effectively be sundered 
and given that the TPP would be attractive to smaller economies and that the latter would probably be 
offered quite accommodating terms, the split would probably deepen through time rather than the 
opposite.  
All of these effects would be even more marked if the other current locus of economic weight - 
Europe – were part of the coalition, and that in my view is essentially what the Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) implies. The agenda of TTIP has many parallels with that of the 
TPP and seeks to go further with deeper agreement on regulatory issues. An avowed aim is to 
‘contribute to the development of global rules that can strengthen the multilateral trading system’ 
(http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/february/statement-US-EU-
Presidents) and ‘to enshrine Europe and America's role as the world's standard-setters’ ( European 
President Van Rompuy at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/remarks-
president-obama-uk-prime-minister-cameron-european-commission-pr). This reads very much 
like an agreement to cooperate to make sure that outcomes in the trading system are as the US and EU 
want them – and with around half of world GDP between them and a further 15% in the rest of TPP, it 
suggests that the choice facing others will be capitulation vs. exclusion.  
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For example, the press reports that TPP intellectual property protections will be even stronger than in the US-Koran Free 
Trade Agreement, which is well beyond the WTO’s TRIPs. They give considerable advantages to the current owners of 
intellectual property and probably hinder the development of alternative loci of innovation. 
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Some time ago Patrick Messerlin suggested that the EU and China should reach a trade accord of 
their own. While I do not like discriminatory arrangements in principle, it would at least offer an 
alternative locus of rule-writing to the TPP. In fact, the Europeans are currently wholly devoted to 
negotiating TTIP. This has a further advantage for the US-centric approach: while TTIP is dangled in 
front of them there is next to no chance that the EU will seriously engage with China. It is true that the 
EU is negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty with China – although these negotiations have a very 
low public profile in Europe – but there is no discussion of it going any further.  
To conclude, while direct efforts to exclude China from effective membership of the world trading 
system by introducing the notion of exchange rate manipulation as a cause for trade remedies have 
failed, the indirect approach of building a rule-making coalition which can more-or-less impose rules 
on the rest of the world seems to be making progress. Thus in terms of my title, I do indeed fear that 
China might be ‘out’ over the next decade. As China’s growth continues, its economic and political 
power will grow and this exclusionary approach puts me very much in mind of Cordell Hull’s 
strictures about discrimination: “you could not separate the idea of commerce from the idea of war and 
peace. ... wars were often largely caused by economic rivalry conducted unfairly.” (Hull, 1948, p 84)  
6. Concluding Thoughts 
China’s economic rise has been remarkable – faster and far larger than we have ever seen before or 
could even have dreamt of three decades ago. The benefits in terms of increased global output and 
income are large and, at least to the extent that these are manifest in rising commodity prices, they are 
shared with some of the poorest countries in the world. Adjustment to such a shock is inevitably 
painful at times and in places, and I have identified a number of such instances in this paper. However, 
while the first twenty-five years of adjustment to China’s emergence were characterised by strong 
Chinese growth and pretty accommodating policies among established powers, the period since 2005 
has been characterised by increasing angst on the part of other countries. This in turn has led to move 
from a position that was generally fairly accepting and welcoming (with some exceptions, of course) 
to one in which the prevailing sentiment, especially in the USA, appears to be one of fear and 
exclusion. The events I have discussed here certainly do not suggest that the advanced nations face no 
costs in adjusting to China, but I would argue that they can also be large beneficiaries and that some of 
the issues that have concerned them have cured themselves in the natural course of events. Thus I do 
not believe that we are well advised to rush to change the world trading system rules in order ease 
stresses perceived to be emanating from China. Rather we should seek to preserve the multilateral 
system that is the pinnacle of the post-war settlement and seek to engage China as an equal in a 
cooperative fashion. Thus this paper concludes by expressing considerable reservations about the 
creation of mega-regional trading agreements that exclude – arguably consciously and intentionally – 
China, the second largest economy in the world.  
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